Many people oppose the creation of the NCTC. Some say it will do nothing to curb terror. Others call it bureaucratic overkill: another agency on top of nearly two dozen others. Many talk of how the NCTC, in its current form, is anti-federal.
I agree with the last point, as long as the qualifier "in its current form" is added. I disagree with the first two. Using the 26/11 example, I will demonstrate how an NCTC could have stopped the attack WITHOUT "damaging" our federal structure.
Before I do, I've pulled excerpts from
this excellent article by Shishir Gupta in the Indian Express, detailing the failures of our security apparatus before and during the 26/11attack.
His primary findings:
- In September 2008, the IB had intel about an LeT operation to take hostages at Mumbai hotels, including the Taj.
- Eight days before the attack, R&AW received information about an LeT ship off the Indian coast, including its latitude and longitude. The Coast Guard only arrived three days later. It found nothing.
- On the morning of 26/11 R&AW intercepted communications near the Bangladeshi border requesting for the activation of 10 SIM cards. The input went nowhere.
- After the attack began, the Mumbai Police control room was found terribly wanting. This paralyzed the actions of first responders.
- With the situation now beyond its control. the Maharashtra government asked for help from navy Marine Commandos. They refused to intervene without written authorisation.
- The NSG arrived 7 hours after the attacks began. They took over the operation a full five hours later. This was thanks to several procedural delays, including the lack of transport aircraft. If the NCTC existed - and worked as I imagine it should - here's what could have happened.
I make three assumptions here.
First, that the NCTC would receive
all terror-related inputs from all intelligence agencies.
Second, that the NCTC can requisition any intelligence and offensive/defensive assets in pursuit of live intelligence.
Third, that the states would cooperate if intelligence was shared with them in a transparent manner, in the interest of protecting their citizens.
Here we go:
1. Starting with the September alert from the IB, an NCTC would direct the Mumbai police to boost security around the hotels. Specific procedures would be put in place to respond to an attack.
2. By November, with no sign of an attack, security was withdrawn. This is understandable. Heightened security costs money. Still, the hotel, local police and national security agencies would have the procedures to fall back on.
3. Then came the R&AW input on the LeT boat on November 18. Instead of wasting three days, an NCTC would have immediately sent the latitude and longitude of the suspected ship to the Navy and Coast Guard. It would've directed spy satellites to scan the area even faster. A fully-kitted-out ARC aircraft would have been sent in to augment Navy and Coast Guard search. It is highly likely the LeT boat would have been found and the terrorists stopped before they even got close.
4. For the sake of the exercise, let's imagine the terrorists did get through. Recalling the September input, the NCTC would put 2 and 2 together. An NCTC officer would like say: "The LeT had planned to attack Mumbai. Now we know an LeT ship has got through our search cordon". Immediately a defensive perimeter of coast guard and naval assets would be drawn around Mumbai. Beat patrols would be stepped up, particularly along the shore. The NTRO would be scanning the area with its antennas to pick up any radio or sat-phone signals.
5. We now know the LeT hit squad signalled its handlers in Pakistan on the morning of 26/11 that they were close. The R&AW intercepted a call near Bangladesh asking for the activation of 10 SIM cards. NTRO scanners - if they were placed in the area - would have immediately latched on to the sat-phone's signal, narrowing the search corridor. Here too, the terrorists may have been stopped.
6. For the sake of our exercise, let's assume the LeT squad was extremely good and still got through. Having made no arrests, an NCTC would have immediately directed a 'bandobast' around south Mumbai. ATS from around the city and the NSG from Manesar would be deployed (this is pre-NSG hub days, remember). Individual platoons would be sent to each target hotel.
7. At 9:21 when the terrorists struck, the police would be waiting for them. The NSG would be waiting for them. But, as I showed in steps 3 and 5, it is more likely the situation would never reach this stage.
Can anyone poke holes in this functioning? I'm a journalist. Not a security expert. Can you also point out where exactly the NCTC would have "damaged" our federal structure in all this?